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LABOR LAW-FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION-AN INROAD THROUGH THE VIOLENCE
DOCTRINE-The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's enforcement of an order obtained by the Kohler Company from the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board enjoining the appellant union, as a
violation of the "Wisconsin Employment Peace Act, 1 from further engaging
in mass picketing, coercion, and other activities, which were also unfair
labor practices under the amended National Labor Relations Act, 2 to which
the Kohler Company was subject. On appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, held, affirmed, three justices dissenting. While, as a general matter,
a state may not, in furtherance of its public policy, enjoin conduct which
has been made an unfair labor practice under the federal statutes, an injunction based on the dominant interest of the state in preventing violence
and property damage can properly be granted. The dissenting justices

1
2

Wis. Stat. (1955) §§111.04, 111.06 (2) (a) and (f), 111.07 (1).
61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §8 (b) (1) (A).
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maintained that a state cannot duplicate an administrative remedy prescribed by Congress reaching identical conduct. United Automobile Workers v. WERB, 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
As explained in Garner v. Teamsters Union, "when two separate
remedies are brought to bear on the same activity, a conflict is imminent.
... To avoid facing a conflict between the state and federal remedies, we
would have to assume either that both authorities will always agree as to
whether the picketing should continue, or that the State's temporary injunc~on will be dissolved as soon as the federal Board acts." 3 Since it was
within the power of the Board to grant an injunction in that case, the
power of the state court was held to be pre-empted in order to avoid a
conflict of remedy. This doctrine was approved and explained further in
United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp. 4 in which
the Court stated that "To the extent that Congress prescribed preventive
procedure against unfair labor practices, that case [Garner] recognized that
the Act excluded conflicting state procedure to the same end." The Court
there allowed a recovery for tort damages since that remedy was not in
conflict with any federal remedy. This rule of federal pre-emption to
avoid a conflict of remedies was again emphasized in the decision in Weber
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 5 The Court denied the right of a state to enjoin
conduct which violated the state restraint of trade law, stating that "Controlling and therefore superseding federal power cannot be curtailed by the
State even though the ground of intervention be different than that on which
federal supremacy has been exercised." 6 The principal case does not overrule Garner, but gives effect to the pre-Taft-Hartley Allen-Bradley• decision
by excepting from the general rule of pre-emption "mass picketing, violence,
and overt threats of violence," even though the union commits an unfair
labor practice and is now subject to issuance of an injunction by the federal
board. Preventing violence and property damage was said to be "a matter
of genuine local concern." 8 Under this simple "local concern" test it
would be difficult to justify the Weber decision, since it is at least arguable
that enjoining conduct which violates state restraint of trade laws is as
much a local concern as the power to restrain violence. 0 It appears that
the Court is willing to except from the Garner rule only a special type of
"local concern" activity-protection against violence. It has been suggested
s Gamer v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 at 498, 499 (1953).
347 U.S. 656 at 665 (1954).
11348 U.S. 468 (1955).
G Id. at 480.
7 Allen-Bradley Local v. WERB, 315 U.S. 740 (1942). The principal case affirms uniform state holdings that the federal act does not pre-empt them from enjoining mass
picketing or picketing accompanied by threats or violence. See 32 A.L.R. (2d) 1026, 1036
to 1040 (1953). As pointed out by the Court in note 12 at 274 of the principal case, its
post-Taft-Hartley decisions intimated continued approval of the Allen-Bradley doctrine,
even though the federal act at that time made no provision for enjoining union activities,
thus resulting in no conflict of remedies.
s Principal case at 274.
9 See 54 MICH, L. REv. 540 at 551 (1956).
4
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that perhaps the reason the Court did not except the situation in the Weber
case from the Garner pre-emption doctrine was the fear or suspicion that
state regulations were being used as mere devices for circumventing federal
labor authority-10 Whether or not this possibility was considered in Weber,
the opportunity for such practices is present under the principal decision.11
Under this doctrine, the extent to which a state may regulate labor practices
through injunctions is in great part dependent upon its disposition to find
the illegal acts of violence threatened and its decision on the extent of regulation necessary. The awarding of tort damages by a state as a supplemental remedy to an injunction by the federal board (as in Laburnum)
should not. normally interfere with the national labor policy, nor the effectiveness of strategic labor strikes and picketing, since the remedy is concerned with past acts and there wo:uld be time for an appeal and reversal.12
But where the state is allowed the concurrent power to enjoin, irreparable
damage to the union's efforts and frustration of the national labor policy
can result when the state injunction is first granted.13 The Court's decision
was sound in recognizing the need for protection from violence and overt
threats of violence.14 It certainly is true, however, as said by Justice Douglas
in the dissenting opinion, that this sanction of duplication of remedies "is
pregnant with potentialities of clashes and conflicts."15 The crux of the
problem lies in the inability of the National Labor Relations Board to cope
effectively with such emergencies.16 If action by the Board would be expedited in such instances, it is submitted that injunctions could be granted
without requiring state action, thereby preventing violence and preserving
l0ibid.
11 On the history and' use of the labor injunction see TAYLOR, 1.ABoR PROBLEMS AN!).
LABOR LAw, 2d ed., 483 to 499, and collateral readings at 499 (1950); U.S. Senate Sub•
committee on Labor and Labor-Management Relations of the Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, "State Court Injunctions" Doc. 7, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (1951), hereinafter
referred to as Senate Report.
12 Such an action for damages, however, in addition to an injunction, should increase
the employers bargaining position and tactical advantages with a union. See Senate Re•
port, note 11 supra, at 10 and 50.
13 In addition to possible misapplication of the injunction where proof of the allegation that violence, intimidation, coercion, etc., is inadequate, or the issuance of an injunction that is broader than required, the unions assert such an injunction is a destructive
influence far beyond its terms in that it makes it appear to their members that the courts
are on the side of the company and that a governmental agency has ruled that their stand
lacks merit. Senate Report, note 11 supra, at 17. This Report points out that the high
percentage of injunctive orders that are either reversed or modified on appeal ••. "does
not speak well for the quality of the original proceedings. It is particularly disturbing
when it is recognized that the time element in most labor disputes is so critical that few
cases will ever be appealed." (Emphasis added.) Senate Report, note 11 supra, at 18, 48,
64, and 104.
14 In answer to the argument that enforcement of state criminal law should protect
against such unlawful acts, it should be noted that in practice local police are often reluctant to interfere in labor disputes until an injunction is issued. See Senate Report, note
11 supra, at 9, 55, 57 and 86.
111 Principal case at 276.
16 See Senate Report, note 11 supra, at 56.

1957]

RECENT DECISIONS

457

the. integrity of the national labor policy simultaneously.11 Until some
such time, however, it is well that the Court will not "interpret an act of
Congress to leave [the states] powerless to avert such emergencies without
compelling directions to that effect.''18
Richard E. Day

17 See recommendations in U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Labor and Labor-Manage•
ment Relations of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, "The Problem of Delay
in Administering the Labor-Management Relations Act," Staff Report, 82d Cong., 2d
sess. (1952), and Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government,
Report on Legal Services and Procedure, Recommendation No. 50 at 85, that certain judicial functions, including issuance of injunctive orders by the NLRB be transferred to the
federal courts.
18 Principal case at 275. See general comments on federalism in principal case at 270,
n.4.

